Security review guide
Reviewing an AI supplier with no SOC 2 report
A SOC 2 report is a certified public accountant (CPA) firm's examination of a supplier's system and its controls over security, availability, processing integrity, confidentiality or privacy, against criteria set by the American Institute of CPAs (AICPA). It covers the system in its scope and nothing else. When an AI supplier has no report, scale the review to what the supplier will touch. A supplier that will host your data should show detailed evidence for that system or be ruled out. A supplier whose engineers work inside your own accounts, under identities you issue, can be reviewed on its policies, people, devices, subcontractors and incident process, because your own controls govern the rest. Write down what you could not verify and the controls you added, or choose a different supplier.
Security review of an AI supplier. Checking whether an AI supplier can be trusted with your systems and data when it cannot hand over an independent audit report, using evidence scaled to what the supplier will touch.
Checked . The AICPA's pages on SOC 2 and SOC 3, ISO's pages on ISO/IEC 27001 and on certification, the Federal Register text of the banking agencies' third-party guidance, the HIPAA business associate rule in the eCFR, the Cloud Security Alliance's questionnaire page and the OWASP Top 10 for LLM applications were read on this date. Standards and guidance are revised, so check the current versions before you rely on them. This guide is not legal advice.
What a SOC 2 report is, and what it proves
SOC 2 belongs to the System and Organization Controls suite: assurance reports that CPA firms provide under standards the AICPA sets [1]. In a SOC 2 examination, a CPA firm reports on the supplier's description of its system and on its controls relevant to security, availability, processing integrity, confidentiality or privacy, measured against the AICPA's trust services criteria [2, 3]. Customers ask for one because they need to know how a supplier's system protects what they hand over [2].
How much a report is worth to you comes down to three details. Start with the type: in a type 2 examination the auditor reports on whether the controls were suitably designed and whether they operated effectively [4, 5], so ask which type you have been given and which dates it covers. Scope counts as much as type, because a report covers the system it describes and nothing else. Then look at who wrote it. The AICPA's own SOC page carries a notice that it is looking into anonymously published allegations about a compliance vendor that offers SOC services, and it tells service organizations and CPA firms to evaluate SOC services thoroughly [1]. Check the CPA firm the way you would check the supplier.
A SOC 3 report covers the same five areas in less detail, which is why the AICPA treats it as a general-use report that can be freely distributed [6]. It tells you an examination took place and what the auditor concluded. It does not show you which controls were tested.
SOC 2 and ISO 27001 prove different things
A supplier without a SOC 2 report will sometimes offer an ISO/IEC 27001 certificate instead. They are different kinds of evidence. ISO/IEC 27001 sets the requirements for an information security management system, the way an organisation runs security as a whole [7]. A SOC 2 report is an opinion on the controls of one system. Neither contains the other.
| Dimension | SOC 2 report | ISO/IEC 27001 certificate |
|---|---|---|
| What it is [2, 3, 7, 8] | A CPA firm's report on a supplier's system and its controls, against the AICPA's trust services criteria | A certification body's written assurance that the supplier's information security management system meets the standard |
| Who sets the rules [2, 3, 7] | The AICPA, which publishes the criteria and the guide auditors follow | ISO and IEC. The current edition is ISO/IEC 27001:2022, with one amendment published in 2024 |
| Who issues it [1, 8] | A CPA firm | An external certification body. ISO itself does not certify anyone or issue certificates |
| What you receive [6, 8] | A detailed report for the supplier's customers. The freely shareable summary is a SOC 3 | A certificate naming the scope, which you can verify with the certification body or in the IAF CertSearch database |
| What to check [8] | The system in scope, the report type, the dates covered, any exceptions the auditor found, and any controls the report expects you to run yourself | That the scope covers the people and systems doing your work, that the certificate is current, and whether the certification body is accredited |
My view: a current ISO/IEC 27001 certificate from an accredited body, with a scope that covers your work, is good evidence that a supplier runs security as a discipline. It will not show you whether a specific control operated effectively, which is what a type 2 report is for. And if your policy names SOC 2 because a regulator or a customer contract names it, a certificate does not change that. ISO notes that accreditation is not compulsory and that an unaccredited certification body is not necessarily disreputable [8], but its certificate is weaker evidence.
Start with what the supplier will touch
The question behind a SOC 2 requirement is whether a supplier can be trusted with your data. For an AI supplier the answer depends on where the work happens, so settle that before you choose the evidence. The table is my starting position for each case, not a rule. If the supplier's work will feed financial reporting at a company that reports to the SEC, its auditor will ask a separate question about service organisations, which our guide to SOX controls for AI in the finance close covers.
| Dimension | What to ask for | Can a missing report be accepted? |
|---|---|---|
| It hosts a product or platform that stores or processes your data | Detailed evidence for the hosted system: an in-scope report or certificate, or a full control description with independent penetration test results | Rarely. This is the case SOC 2 was built for, and the gap sits in a system only the supplier runs |
| It builds inside your cloud accounts and repositories, under identities you issue | Evidence about people, devices, access and subcontractors, and a data-flow diagram of what it builds | Often, with conditions, because your own identity, logging and access controls govern the environment |
| It sends your data to an AI model provider under its own contract | The provider's name, its terms on retention and training, its own assurance report, and the region the data is processed in | Only if the provider's evidence covers the gap, because your data then sits in a system neither you nor the supplier runs |
| It advises and never touches production data | Policies, confidentiality terms and device standards | Usually. The exposure is what its people see in meetings and documents |
US banking regulators apply the same logic. The interagency guidance the Federal Reserve, the FDIC and the OCC published in June 2023 says due diligence should be tailored to the activity and scaled to its risk and complexity, and that where relevant and available a bank may consider SOC reports and independent certifications, checking whether their scope and results fit the activity [9]. The agencies state that supervisory guidance does not have the force and effect of law [9], and it is written for banks, but I have not seen a better model for any buyer.
What to ask for instead
This is the list I would send, roughly in this order. Each item is cheap for a serious supplier to produce, and a slow or vague answer is information too.
- Written security policies
- Information security, access control, acceptable use and incident response, each with an owner and a date it was last reviewed. A policy with no review date tells you nobody has looked at it.
- How its people get access
- Named accounts from your identity provider, multi-factor authentication, access limited to the work, and removal on the last day. The banking agencies name multifactor authentication and secure source code management among the controls worth checking [9].
- Device standards
- Disk encryption, patching, screen lock and malware protection on every laptop that will hold your code or data, and whether the supplier enforces them centrally or trusts each person to.
- Penetration test summary
- For anything the supplier hosts: the latest independent test's scope, date and the status of each finding. The banking agencies list penetration test results among the evidence that shows where a system is weak [9]. For an AI system, ask whether the test covered prompt injection and sensitive information disclosure, the first two risks on the OWASP list for LLM applications [11].
- An ISO/IEC 27001 certificate, if it holds one
- Check that the scope covers the people and systems doing your work, and verify the certificate with the certification body or through IAF CertSearch [8].
- Insurance
- Confirmation that the supplier carries cover suited to the work, and a clause in your contract that says so. Your own risk or legal team will know which kinds of cover your policy expects.
- A data-flow diagram
- Every place your data goes: your systems, the supplier's devices, the model provider, logging and monitoring tools, and the region each one runs in.
- Subprocessors
- Every subcontractor and service that will touch your data, including the model provider, with each one's own evidence. The banking guidance asks whether the scope and results of reports suggest more scrutiny of a third party or any of its contractors [9].
- Incident process
- Who the supplier tells, how quickly it will notify you, and a named contact. Put the notification period in the contract.
- The people
- Who will do the work, how they were vetted, and whether you can meet them before you sign.
If your team works from a standard questionnaire, the Cloud Security Alliance publishes one, the CAIQ, as yes-or-no questions mapped to its Cloud Controls Matrix [10]. It was written for cloud providers, so cut what does not apply to a supplier working inside your accounts. Then add the AI questions a generic questionnaire misses: where prompts and outputs are stored and for how long, whether any provider may train on them, and what the system is allowed to do without a person approving it.
What to accept, and when to walk away
The banking guidance also covers the situation this page is about. When a bank cannot get the information it wants from a third party, it should document the limits of its due diligence and the risks they leave, then get other information, add controls or monitoring, or use a different third party [9]. That is a good shape for any exception, so write yours in those terms and give it a review date.
- Accept when
- The supplier works inside your environment under identities you issue, its answers are specific and consistent, the scope is fixed, and the controls that matter most are ones you run: access, logging and the ability to remove it in minutes.
- Add these conditions
- A security schedule in the contract, a notification period for incidents, named people whose access is reviewed monthly, no production data in development without sign-off, and a date on which the exception is reviewed again.
- Walk away when
- The supplier will host your regulated data and cannot evidence the controls on that system; a regulator or a customer contract makes the report a hard requirement; the answers stay vague after a second round; it will not name its subcontractors or its model provider; or it describes a report it cannot produce.
One requirement no evidence pack replaces. If the supplier will create, receive, maintain or transmit protected health information on behalf of a HIPAA covered entity, the covered entity may allow that only if it obtains satisfactory assurance that the supplier will appropriately safeguard the information. Where the supplier is a subcontractor of a business associate, such as a health-tech company serving covered entities, that business associate obtains the assurance instead. Either way, the assurance must be documented in a written contract or other written agreement or arrangement [12]. A SOC 2 report does not stand in for that agreement. This guide is not legal advice.
Where 1AYM fits
1AYM is not SOC 2 audited today, and we hold no ISO or SOC certification. We do not imply one. If your policy makes either a hard requirement, we are the wrong supplier for you, and a first call is a cheaper place to find that out than the end of a scoring round.
Most of our delivery work sits in the second row of the table above. We build in your repositories and your environments, so the systems we build run in your estate, under your controls. Our delivery engineers work under identities you issue, nothing we deliver depends on a system only 1AYM can reach, and a fixed-scope statement of work keeps our access as narrow as the scope. Much of that work is rolling out AI tools across a client's own teams, as in our AI platform enablement engagement. What we put in front of a reviewer is the control set, the evidence each control produces and the engineers who built them. You meet those engineers before you sign, we hold the relevant insurance, and US clients can contract through our US entity. Where the contract needs it, copyright in the deliverables is assigned to you.
Our AI governance implementation work is the other side of this guide: identity, verifier gates, evaluation in CI and audit trails built into the platform, so a reviewer can check what enforces a policy instead of reading about it. A small job runs as a fixed-scope statement of work, and the build can start within a day of the scope being signed. Larger work is a Production AI systems engagement: a fixed-scope architecture and production build.
For engineers: the technical checks, and how to run them
A supplier's answers are claims until you can see them in configuration. These are the checks I would run on a supplier working inside your estate, and most of them need nothing from the supplier at all.
- Identity
- Supplier staff get accounts from your identity provider, in a group of their own, with multi-factor authentication enforced and access granted and removed through SCIM or your joiner and leaver process. Export the group each month and compare it with the named people in the statement of work.
- Credentials
- No long-lived cloud keys. CI and deployment use short-lived tokens through workload identity federation (OIDC), people use single sign-on to the console, and secret scanning runs on every repository the supplier can push to.
- Repositories
- Branch protection on the default branch, required review from your own engineers, and no supplier-owned repository anywhere in the delivery path.
- Model endpoints
- Every model call goes to an endpoint in your account or under your contract with the provider, with the region, retention and training settings written down. Egress rules stop code calling a provider you have not approved.
- Data in development
- Synthetic or masked data by default. Production data in a development environment needs a named approver, a reason and an expiry date.
- Logs
- Supplier activity lands in your own log store: cloud audit logs, repository audit logs and model call logs, each with the identity that acted. The supplier cannot delete them.
- AI-specific testing
- Test against the OWASP Top 10 for LLM applications, in particular prompt injection, sensitive information disclosure and excessive agency, and check what the system can do without a person approving it [11].
- Exit
- One runbook removes every supplier identity, key, webhook and integration. Run it once in a test environment before the engagement starts.
Sources
- [1]AICPA & CIMA, System and Organization Controls: SOC suite of services, SOC 2 topic page and notice, read 29 September 2026
- [2]AICPA & CIMA, SOC 2 Reporting on an Examination of Controls at a Service Organization, guide updated 15 October 2022, read 29 September 2026
- [3]AICPA & CIMA, 2017 Trust Services Criteria (with revised points of focus, 2022), read 29 September 2026
- [4]AICPA & CIMA, Illustrative service auditor's SOC 2 type 2 report (SSAE 21), read 29 September 2026
- [5]AICPA & CIMA, Addressing additional subject matter and criteria in a SOC 2 engagement, 17 September 2019, read 29 September 2026
- [6]AICPA & CIMA, SOC 3: trust services criteria for general use report, read 29 September 2026
- [7]ISO, ISO/IEC 27001:2022 Information security management systems: requirements (edition 3, October 2022; Amendment 1, 2024), Internet Archive copy of 28 September 2026, read 29 September 2026
- [8]ISO, Certification: choosing a certification body and verifying a certificate, Internet Archive copy of 19 September 2026, read 29 September 2026
- [9]Federal Reserve, FDIC and OCC, Interagency Guidance on Third-Party Relationships: Risk Management, 88 FR 37920, 9 June 2023, read 29 September 2026
- [10]Cloud Security Alliance, STAR Level 1 Security Questionnaire (CAIQ v4), 7 June 2021, read 29 September 2026
- [11]OWASP, Top 10 for LLM Applications 2025, read 29 September 2026
- [12]eCFR, 45 CFR 164.502(e): business associate disclosures, read 29 September 2026
Security review questions
Is there such a thing as SOC 2 certification?
No. The AICPA describes SOC 2 as an examination a CPA firm performs, and the output is a report with the auditor's opinion, not a certificate. When a supplier says it is SOC 2 certified or compliant, ask for the report, the name of the CPA firm and the dates it covers.
Is ISO 27001 equivalent to SOC 2?
They overlap, but they prove different things. An ISO/IEC 27001 certificate says a certification body found the supplier's information security management system meets the standard. A SOC 2 report is an auditor's opinion on the controls of a specific system. Whether one can replace the other is for your own policy to say, and where a regulator or a customer contract names SOC 2, for that document.
Can we accept a SOC 3 report instead?
A SOC 3 covers the same five areas as a SOC 2 in less detail, which is why it can be shared freely. It tells you what the auditor concluded, not which controls were tested or what exceptions were found. Use it to confirm a report exists, then ask for the SOC 2 under a confidentiality agreement.
What can you accept from a supplier whose SOC 2 is still in progress?
Treat it as having no report yet. Ask for the CPA firm's name, the report type and the dates it will cover, review the supplier on the evidence in this guide in the meantime, and put the date the report will be shared in the contract, with what happens if it is not.
Does a model provider's SOC 2 report cover the supplier?
No. A report covers the system in its scope. A model provider's report describes how the provider runs its service. It says nothing about the supplier's people, laptops or subcontractors, or about how the supplier configured that service for you.
Further
- AI governance implementation · Identity, verifier gates, evaluation in CI and audit trails, built into the platform so a reviewer can check them.
- AI governance framework · An eight-clause AI policy, each clause mapped to the control, the owner and the evidence behind it.
- Choosing an AI supplier · Four checks for any supplier you bring in: who writes the code, proof in production, controls, and what you keep.
- Private LLM deployment · Where the model should run when your data has to stay inside your own boundary.
We build these systems for a living. See the engagement files for what that looks like in practice, or write to us if yours is the next one.
Last reviewed · 1AYM