Guide
AI in the month-end close: the SOX controls to set before agents run
Yes, provided each AI step sits inside internal control over financial reporting rather than beside it. Section 404 of the Sarbanes-Oxley Act has management assess those controls every year, and SEC rules require management to evaluate, each quarter, any change that has materially affected or is reasonably likely to materially affect them. A model that prepares reconciliations, accruals or journal entries is part of that system, so before it runs in a live close it needs four things: change management over the model version, prompts and configuration; access limited to its task, with nobody able to both change it and approve its output; a record of every run that an auditor can re-perform; and a named reviewer who approves anything that posts, at a precision that would catch a material error. The model prepares the work, and a person with authority owns the control.
AI in internal control over financial reporting. Bringing AI steps in the financial close inside a company's internal control over financial reporting, so that change management, access control, evidence and human review cover them as they cover any other system that touches the ledger.
Checked . The Sarbanes-Oxley Act, SEC rules and guidance, and PCAOB auditing standards were read on the publishers' own pages on this date. The PCAOB has adopted amendments to AS 2201 (paragraph .09 and a new paragraph .99) and AS 2110 (paragraphs .05 and .41) that take effect on 15 December 2026; none of the paragraphs this guide relies on is among them. This guide is not legal, accounting or audit advice: agree the design of any control with your external auditor before you rely on it.
Who SOX 404 applies to, and why an AI step is in scope
Section 404 of the Sarbanes-Oxley Act requires each annual report a company files with the SEC to include management's assessment of its internal control over financial reporting, and the company's auditor attests to that assessment [1]. The auditor's attestation does not apply to an emerging growth company, or to a company that is neither an accelerated filer nor a large accelerated filer [1, 4]. A newly public company's first annual report needs neither report [4].
SEC rules define that internal control as a process designed by, or under the supervision of, the chief executive and chief financial officers to give reasonable assurance about the reliability of financial reporting. It includes keeping records that accurately and fairly reflect transactions, and making receipts and expenditures only as management and directors authorise [2]. The same two officers sign a certification with every quarterly and annual report [3]. Nothing in the definition asks whether a person, a spreadsheet or a model prepared an entry. If an AI step prepares reconciliations, accruals or journal entries that reach the financial statements, it is part of the system being assessed.
SOX 404 itself reaches only companies that report to the SEC. A private company meets it when it lists, or when its close becomes part of a listed company's, and a control is cheaper to design in than to retrofit onto a close that already depends on it.
What a model changes about internal control
Internal control has long been built from two kinds of control: manual ones, such as approvals, reviews and reconciliations, and automated ones inside the systems that record and process transactions [7]. Auditors treat an automated control as lower risk when the IT general controls around it work [6]. PCAOB standards even let an auditor carry forward last year's test of an entirely automated control, a strategy they call benchmarking, because such controls are generally not subject to breakdowns due to human failure and the auditor can verify the program has not changed [6].
A model step fits neither box cleanly. It can produce different output for the same input, and a hosted model can change when its vendor updates it unless you pin a specific version. So I would not treat an AI step as an automated control that is tested once and relied on. Treat it as a preparer: something that produces work which a control then checks. The same concern came up in outreach that PCAOB staff reported in July 2024. Preparers pointed to the black-box nature of some generative AI tools and the lack of consistent output as raising questions about whether that output can be audited, and some audit firms said its use by preparers could amplify existing IT risks, such as those around segregation of duties [9].
That one distinction decides almost everything below. The model can draft the reconciliation. The control is the automatic tie-out to the subledger and the reviewer who signs it.
Where an AI step sits against each control objective
The table maps the usual control objectives in the close to what can go wrong when a model prepares the work, the control that answers each risk, and what an auditor can inspect. The risks come from the IT risks PCAOB standards tell auditors to understand, applied to an AI step [7].
| Dimension | What can go wrong with an AI step | The control | Evidence an auditor can inspect |
|---|---|---|---|
| Completeness | The model skips items, such as lines it could not read or match | Input counts and totals reconciled to output on every run, with any gap held for a person | The run record, showing counts and totals in and out, and each held item |
| Accuracy | A plausible but wrong match, amount or account code | Automatic checks against the ledger and subledger before anything is proposed: tie-outs, debits equal to credits, valid accounts and an open period | The check results for each proposed entry, pass or fail |
| Authorisation | An entry posts without anyone with authority approving it | The AI step drafts only, and a named reviewer with posting authority approves in the ledger's normal workflow | Approver, time and the evidence they saw, recorded in the ledger |
| Segregation of duties | The same person or identity changes the AI step, runs it and approves what it produces | The agent runs under its own identity with no posting or approval rights, and whoever changes its configuration cannot approve its entries | Access listings for the agent's identity and the change log, reviewed each quarter |
| Change management | A new model version, prompt or mapping table changes results and nobody notices | Pinned versions, a regression test on past closes, and approval before any change reaches a live close | A change record for each release, with test results and approver |
| Access to data | The step reads or changes data beyond its task, or someone who has left can still run it | Least-privilege access for the agent, granted and removed the way a person's is | Provisioning records and periodic access reviews |
| Reliable reports | A schedule the AI produced is used as evidence with no check on where its figures came from | Every output line traceable to its source records, so a reviewer or an auditor can re-perform it | Links from each output line to source documents and ledger entries |
Two rows carry most of the weight. The agent never holds posting rights, and every proposed entry passes automatic checks before a person sees it, so the reviewer spends their time on exceptions rather than re-reading a queue that is mostly right. That is the pattern we call agent proposes, verifier gates, and it is the one I would start from in any close.
Change management: a new model version is a program change
SEC guidance for management names the IT general control areas that may matter to the assessment: program development, program changes, computer operations, and access to programs and data [5]. For an AI step, the program is more than code. It is the model and its version, the prompt, the tool definitions, the mapping tables and thresholds, and any documents the step retrieves. PCAOB standards already make the point for ordinary software: an automated calculation can depend on the files, tables, data and parameters around it, such as the rate table behind an interest calculation [6]. A prompt or a mapping table is exactly that kind of parameter.
So every one of those components goes through the same change process as a change to the ERP. It is written, tested against a fixed set of past cases with known right answers, approved by someone other than its author, and deployed by the pipeline rather than by hand. Pin the model version where the vendor lets you, and treat a vendor's version change as a change you test before it reaches a live close.
Then there is the quarterly question. SEC rules require management to evaluate, each quarter, any change in internal control over financial reporting that has materially affected or is reasonably likely to materially affect it, and the company's periodic reports disclose such a change [2, 4]. Whether moving part of the close onto an AI step meets that bar is a judgement for management and its auditor. Make it deliberately before go-live, rather than discovering it at year-end.
Access and segregation of duties for an agent
The IT risks PCAOB standards ask auditors to understand include unauthorised access to data that leads to recording unauthorised or non-existent transactions, IT staff gaining access beyond their duties and so breaking down segregation of duties, unauthorised changes to master files, and inappropriate manual intervention [7]. An agent running on broad credentials puts all four in one place.
Give the agent its own identity: never a person's login, and never a service account other jobs share. Scope it to the entities, accounts and periods its task needs, read-only by default, with write access only to a draft or staging area that the ledger's approval workflow controls. Grant and remove its access the way you do a person's, from a source of truth, and include it in the quarterly access review. The identity provisioning system we built for a client runs on that rule: access follows the HR record, not someone's memory.
The separation that matters most is between the people who can change the AI step and the people who approve what it produces. If one engineer can edit the prompt and also approve the journal, the control has a hole, however good the model is.
Evidence: what your auditor will ask to see and re-perform
Management must keep evidential matter, including documentation, that gives reasonable support for its assessment [4], and SEC guidance says documentation of how the controls are designed is an integral part of that support [5]. Auditors test a control through inquiry, observation, inspection of documents and re-performance, and a walkthrough follows a transaction from origination through the company's systems until it is reflected in the financial records [6]. When an auditor relies on information the company produced, such as a reconciliation or a schedule, the standard has them test its accuracy and completeness, or the controls over it [8].
For an AI step, that means a record of every run: which inputs it read, the model and prompt versions, what it proposed, which checks passed or failed, who reviewed it, what they changed, and when. Keep it append-only, for as long as your records policy requires. Some audit firms told PCAOB staff they design their own generative AI tools to document the source data used [9], and a finance team's tools should meet at least that bar. An auditor should be able to pick any line in a close schedule and trace it to its source documents without asking the model to explain itself.
Review: the person who signs, and what they need to see
A control is only as good as the person operating it. PCAOB standards test whether a control operates as designed and whether the person performing it has the authority and competence to do so, and a compensating control only counts if it works at a precision that would catch a material misstatement [6].
Two failure modes worry me more than a wrong model output. The first is a reviewer who approves a queue because it is usually right, until the review is a signature and nothing more. The second is a review of the output alone, with none of the evidence behind it. Design the review so the reviewer sees exceptions first, sees the source behind each proposed entry, and records what they checked. Some audit firms told PCAOB staff that supervisors reviewing work done with generative AI are expected to apply the same diligence as for any other work, and preparers said human supervision of the tools and review of their output remain important [9].
When the model runs at a vendor
Where the AI step calls a model hosted by a vendor, PCAOB standards treat a service organisation whose services form part of a company's information system as part of that company's internal control. They describe routes to evidence that its controls work, including a service auditor's report that tests those controls over the right period, and tests of the company's own controls over what the vendor does, such as re-performing selected items or reconciling output reports with source documents [6].
Check what a vendor's assurance report covers before you count on it for the close. Where it does not reach what you need, the evidence has to come from your side: the automatic checks against your ledger and the reviewer's sign-off. That is one more reason to build the controls around the model rather than hoping for them inside it.
A rollout order for AI in the close
The order matters more than the choice of model. This is the sequence I would follow, one process at a time.
- 1. One process, with an owner
- Pick a single reconciliation or accrual with a named control owner, a known volume and a history of the errors it produces. Leave judgement-heavy estimates until later.
- 2. Write the control down first
- Describe the existing control, then the changed one: what the AI step prepares, which checks run, who reviews and what evidence is kept. Walk your external auditor through it before the build, not after.
- 3. Run it in parallel
- Run the AI step beside the manual close for at least one full cycle and compare the results line by line. Some preparers told PCAOB staff they govern generative AI as they do other technology, for example by running it in a parallel environment before deployment [9].
- 4. Draft only
- The agent drafts into a staging area and never posts. A person with authority approves in the ledger's own workflow.
- 5. Controls live before go-live
- Version pinning, regression tests on past closes, change approvals and append-only run records are in place before the first live close, not added after the first audit query.
- 6. Evaluate the change
- Management evaluates the change in the quarter it goes live, with its auditor, and decides whether it needs disclosing [2, 4]. This is not legal advice.
- 7. Widen slowly
- Add the next process only when the first has run clean through a quarter-end, and the exceptions it raises are ones a reviewer can act on.
Where 1AYM fits
1AYM works in financial services, and we build agentic workflows on the rule this guide argues for: the agent proposes, deterministic checks decide what proceeds, and anything that fails goes to a person with the reason attached. Our documented finance systems work at a large international marketing agency covers reconciliation, management-accounts and trial-balance checks across Xero, NetSuite, Zoho and QuickBooks, alongside managed-agent workflows for finance-critical tasks. We do not audit controls or sign them off; that stays with management and your external auditor. What we do is design and build the AI step so that the change records, the access model and the run evidence in this guide exist from its first live close.
For one process, that is a fixed-scope architecture and production build. If you already have a scoped job and need people to deliver it, we can resource it on contract from the collective of associates who work with 1AYM, held to the same standard. If you are weighing AI in your close, a 30-minute call is enough to test whether the first process you have in mind is the right place to start.
For engineers: change control, identity, gates and run records for AI in the close
The controls above in engineering terms. Each one can be checked in configuration, code or logs, which is what lets an auditor test it rather than take it on trust.
- Configuration as code
- Model identifier and version, prompts, tool schemas, mapping tables and thresholds live in the repository. Changes go through pull requests approved by someone other than the author, and only the deployment pipeline can change what runs in production.
- Version pinning
- Call a dated model version rather than a moving alias where the vendor offers one. Treat a deprecation notice as a change request with its own regression run.
- Regression set from past closes
- Build the evaluation set from real prior-period items with their booked answers, awkward ones included. Run it on every change and record results against thresholds agreed with the control owner.
- Identity and least privilege
- Run each agent as its own service principal: read access to the ledgers and subledgers it needs, write access only to a draft or staging journal, and no right to post or approve. No person shares its credentials.
- Deterministic gates
- Before a proposal reaches a reviewer: debits equal credits, accounts and cost centres are valid, the period is open, amounts tie to the subledger or bank data, and totals reconcile to the input set. A failure holds the item with the reason.
- Idempotent writes
- Key each draft entry on a run identifier and a source identifier, so a retry cannot create a duplicate journal.
- Run records
- Per run: input references and hashes, model and prompt versions, tool calls, outputs, gate results, reviewer identity, edits and timestamps. Append-only storage, retention set by the records policy, queryable by period and account.
- Non-determinism
- Do not assume a re-run reproduces a past output. Gate on outputs, store what was produced, and never rely on running the model again to explain an entry already booked.
- Kill switch and fallback
- A flag that stops the AI step without a deploy, and a documented manual procedure the team can run the same day, rehearsed before quarter-end.
Sources
- [1]Sarbanes-Oxley Act section 404, 15 U.S.C. 7262: management assessment of internal controls (United States Code, 2023 edition, GovInfo), read 29 September 2026
- [2]SEC Rule 13a-15, 17 CFR 240.13a-15: controls and procedures (eCFR, up to date as of 25 September 2026), read 29 September 2026
- [3]SEC Rule 13a-14, 17 CFR 240.13a-14: certification of disclosure in annual and quarterly reports (eCFR, up to date as of 25 September 2026), read 29 September 2026
- [4]Regulation S-K Item 308, 17 CFR 229.308: internal control over financial reporting (eCFR, up to date as of 25 September 2026), read 29 September 2026
- [5]SEC Release No. 33-8810, Commission guidance regarding management's report on internal control over financial reporting (PDF, effective 27 June 2007), read 29 September 2026
- [6]PCAOB AS 2201, An audit of internal control over financial reporting that is integrated with an audit of financial statements, read 29 September 2026
- [7]PCAOB AS 2110, Identifying and assessing risks of material misstatement, Appendix B, read 29 September 2026
- [8]PCAOB AS 1105, Audit evidence, paragraph .10, read 29 September 2026
- [9]PCAOB staff Spotlight, Staff update on outreach activities related to the integration of generative artificial intelligence in audits and financial reporting (PDF, July 2024), read 29 September 2026
Frequently asked questions
Does SOX apply to private companies using AI in finance?
Section 404 applies to companies that file annual reports with the SEC, so a private company is not assessed under it. A company that lists meets the requirement from its second annual report, and the auditor's attestation applies to accelerated and large accelerated filers that are not emerging growth companies. Designing the controls in before listing is cheaper than retrofitting them onto a close that already depends on AI. Based on the statute and SEC rules read on 29 September 2026; not legal advice.
Can an AI agent post journal entries in a SOX environment?
No rule forbids a model from preparing an entry. What matters is whether the controls around it prevent or detect a material misstatement on time. I would keep posting and approval with a person who has the authority for it, have the agent draft into a staging area, and run automatic checks on every draft before anyone reviews it.
Is changing the AI model a change in internal control that we have to disclose?
It is a change to evaluate. SEC rules require management to evaluate, each quarter, any change that has materially affected or is reasonably likely to materially affect internal control over financial reporting, and periodic reports disclose such a change. Whether a model change meets that bar depends on what the step does and the controls around it, so decide it with your auditor. Based on SEC rules read on 29 September 2026; not legal advice.
Can the AI step itself be the control?
I would not rely on it alone for anything material. PCAOB standards test whether a control operates as designed and whether the person performing it has the authority and competence to do so, and auditors can rely on automated controls partly because they do not change unnoticed. A model that can give different output for the same input fits neither description well. Let it prepare the work, and put the control in the checks and the review.
Can internal audit use AI for SOX testing?
Yes, as a tool the tester directs. It can help select samples, read documents and draft workpapers, with the tester reviewing each result and owning each conclusion. If your external auditor plans to use internal audit's work, PCAOB standards have the auditor assess the competence and objectivity of the people who did it, so the tester, not the tool, answers for the result.
What will our auditor ask for when AI is in the close?
Expect a walkthrough of one transaction through the AI step, the design of each control, the change records for the model and prompts, the access list for the agent's identity, and run records they can re-perform. Reports the AI produced will be tested for accuracy and completeness, or through the controls over them, before they are relied on.
Further
- Agentic workflow design · The engagement this is bought as: verifier gates, tests and human review on finance workflows that must not be wrong.
- AI governance implementation · Governance built as controls the system enforces, with the audit trail as a by-product.
- AI agents for business · Where agents fit in a business, where they do not, and the controls to set first.
- Engagement file D-06 · Finance answers through a connector that carries each person’s existing permissions.
We build these systems for a living. See the engagement files for what that looks like in practice, or write to us if yours is the next one.
Last reviewed · 1AYM